

**01362**

**1963/00/00**

SENSITIVE

IX. A.5a.

(2) War Between Cuba and Another LA State

(a) Objective - To capitalize on the contingency of war breaking out between Cuba and another LA state by using the "obligation" to support an ally to overthrow Castro.

(b) The Scenario - The war or outbreak of hostilities between Castro and another state could come in one of five ways:

1) A contrived "Cuban" attack on an OAS member could be set up and the Attacked state could be urged to "take measures of self-defense and request assistance from the U.S. and OAS; the U.S. could almost certainly obtain the necessary two-thirds support among OAS members for collective action against Cuba;

2) An actual Cuban attack or Cuban identified subversive action could trigger the same response;

3) A contrived Cuban attack on Jamaica, one of three Guineas, or Trinidad-Tobago could be set up and the U.S. <sup>and</sup> the mother country come to the defense of the attacked state while referring the political action to the UN;

4) An actual Cuban attack on one of the foregoing states could result in similar action;

5) A revolution in Haiti could be set up with the assistance of Cubans-in-exile masquerading as Haitians (or with other appropriate commitment) in exchange for the understanding that the new regime would recognize and provide a base for a Cuban government and would provide assistance including use of force in support of action against the Castro regime.

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In any of the foregoing events the U.S. should follow one of three courses of action to capitalize on the situation by overthrowing Castro since reprisals would not accomplish the objective:

- 4) Initiate an invasion of Cuba;
- b) Initiate a total or POL blockade;
- c) Conduct a disarming airstrike on Cuba calculated to eliminate all known air, land, and sea armaments and POL storage facilities coupled with organization of a U.S. logistically supported rebellion adequate to overthrow Castro.

The specific degree of force to be applied in a given situation would have to vary with the circumstances. If the evidence against Castro were real and provable, and if the nature of his offense were severe, either of itself or because of it represented the straw that broke the camel's back, invasion could be justified and would have the advantage of eliminating the situation rapidly before world opinion could be mobilized to erode actions taken. If the evidence were not provable or the nature of the offense not so severe as to offer the basis for marshalling world opinion in our behalf, the U.S. and her allies might have to confine their actions to blockade. This has the distinct disadvantage of requiring longer to do the job. It involves again the possibility of running the gamut of moves and countermoves between the US and USSR. However, as described in section \*\*\*, the US does have the capability to lay down the challenge in such fashion that the blockade cannot readily be raised by mining Cuban harbors.

~~TOP SECRET~~

(3) Political Effects

For analysis of the effect of the various applications of force to which we would have to resort in order to capitalize on this or other contingencies, see Section IX.A.5.b. This analysis will be limited to the effects implicit in the use of this particular contingency as the pretext leading to the application of those actions.

Any of the contrived situations described above are inherently, extremely risky in our democratic system in which security can be maintained, after the fact, with very great difficulty. If the decision should be made to set up a contrived situation it should be one in which participation by U. S. personnel is limited only to the most highly trusted covert personnel. This suggests the infeasibility of the use of military units for any aspect of the contrived situation. The only area remaining for consideration then would be to bribe one of Castro's subordinate commanders to initiate an attack on Guantanamo or upon another Latin American state or the creation of evidence of Castro's subversive actions in some LA state.

With regard to scenarios (a) and (b) above, the situation would then be played out as stated in Section \_\_\_\_\_ and the political effects would be as summarized therein. With regard to scenarios (c) and (d), the OAS would be less interested in authorizing collective action than would be the case of an attack on an OAS member. There is no question that none of the member countries would consider it in their national interest to participate jointly with the U. S. in a contrived attack. However, in each case they would be quite likely to decide to react jointly with the U. S. against an attack

which did not seem contrived to them. Therefore, any contrived arrangement should be taken unilaterally by the U.S. The playing out of the scenario of an attack on ~~any~~ non-OAS Latin American areas would probably provide a greater degree of support by NATO than would be the case should the scenario be played out around another OAS member because of the closer ties to the mother country and the responsibilities the mother country would have. In this respect, it is particularly interesting to consider the choice of French Guinea for a contrived contingency in view of the recent DeGaulle initiatives in Europe. Nevertheless, our general conclusion is that any contrived situation carries greater risks than benefits.

The degree to which the U. S. would have to show its hand in setting up scenario (e) would probably raise great~~er~~ concern among the OAS members that the U.S. was embarking upon a modern form of interventionism. This course should probably only be pursued when the situation vis-a-vis Cuba had preceded to the point that two-thirds of the OAS membership <sup>were</sup> ~~is~~ judged ready to authorize such covert action. Manifestly that time has not arrived.